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RICHARD JACKSON AND NEIL HOWE: THE GRAYING  
OF THE GREAT POWERS: STUDY GUIDE (2010) 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080630_gai_majorfindings.pdf 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. What does this report explain?  What are its major findings? 
 
Major Findings: The Demographic Transformation 
 
2. What is the significance of a high median age, whether 30, 40, or 50?  What is the significance 
  of a growing number of countries that have shrinking populations?  What is meant by 
  demographic momentum and why is it significant?  Which countries are projected to experience 
  the least aging? 
 
3. Discuss three types of economic, social, and political consequences of the demographic 
 transformation that could undermine the ability of the United States and its traditional allies to 
 maintain security.  What impact is smaller family size likely to have on preparedness for war? 
 
4. What countries (at the opportunity end of the spectrum) are likely to be favored by a 
 “demographic dividend?”   What parts of the world fall closer to the challenge end with youth 
 bulges and chronic civil unrest?  Where might political crises be triggered? 
 
Major Findings: The Geopolitical Implications 
 
5. Why is the global influence of the developed world likely to decline?  What will it need to do to 
 fortify its global position?  Why is the population and GDP of the United States likely to expand 
 steadily as a share of the developed world totals?  What country is likely to remain at the same 
 population ranking during the next four decades? 
 
6. What is a youth bulge?  What might help some nations break the cycle of high fertility and high 
 poverty?  Compared with the youth bulge countries of sub-Saharan Africa and parts of the Muslim 
 world, why are some of the rapidly modernizing “fast-transitioning countries” likely to face even 
 more serious crises?   
 
7. Why will religious conflict become an even more serious global problem?  Why are the 2020s 
  likely to emerge as the decade of maximum geopolitical danger for the developed world?  Why is 
  a “youth echo boom” likely to be a problem during that period?  What light is shed on the 
  situation by the “power transition” theories of global conflict?  What chronic shortages are likely 
  to be faced by aging develop countries?   What will render many developed countries “permanent 
  free riders on their allies?” 
 
 NOTE: Fewer (2004) by Ben J. Wattenberg provides a realistic assessment of the dangers we
 face.  I included the following in a lecture I gave in April 2007.  On page 37 Wattenberg writes:  
 “Consider Europe according to ‘Replacement Migration’ [a 2001 publication of the UN Population 
 Division]: Today Europe has more than twice as many people as the United States, but the whole 
 continent takes in a net of 376,000 immigrants per year, about a third of the American number.  In 
 order to keep a total constant population, that European immigration number would have to rise 
 to 1,917,000 per year, an annual increase of more than 500 percent.  To maintain a constant age 
 group of workers age 15-64, the number of immigrants would have to rise to 3,227,000 per year, 
 an annual increase of more than 900 percent.  The UNPD also calculated what it would take to 
 keep the dependency ratio constant, that is, the proportions of working-age persons to those over 
 age 65 and under 15.  That would require an annual immigration of 27,139,000, an increase of 
 more than 7,100 percent.  That is not likely to happen.” 
  
 Wattenberg’s numbers merely represent the numbers of people who may be required for the 
 maintenance of an aging, affluent population: that is, the amount of additional workers that is 
 required simply to pass along a real inheritance rather than a deficit to future generations.  But 
 even if such high levels of immigration were possible, would they be desirable?  How could any 
 society, especially one seeks to preserve its character, begin to assimilate all the nannies, 
 gardeners, nurses, and other workers needed simply to maintain the status quo or to preserve the 
 infrastructure?   See “The Grapes of Parnassos”:  http://works.bepress.com/steven_samson/51/ 
 
9. What is likely to change the widespread support for the “soft power” of liberal democracy and the 
  global democratic order?  How might illiberal neo-authoritarian regimes win popularity? 
 
A Framework for Policy Action 
 
10. What are some of the authors’ policy recommendations?  
 
Review 
 
high median age  demographic transformation youth bulge 
youth echo boom  power (hegemonic) transition liberal democracy 
neo-authoritarian regimes 
 
Appendix:  Statistical Comparisons from the United Nations Population Division: 
 
World Population Prospects: the 2006 Revision (Excerpts) 
 
TABLE I:2.  DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD POPULATION BY DEVELOPMENT GROUP AND MAJOR 
AREA, 1950, 1975, 2007 and 2050, ACCORDING TO PROJECTION VARIANT (PERCENTAGE) 
 
           Population 
 
Major Area   1950  1975  2007 
 
More Developed  32.1  25.7  18.3 
 
Less Developed  67.9  74.3  81.7 
 
TABLE I:3.  AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF POPULATION CHANGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION IN 
BROAD AGE GROUPS BY MAJOR AREAS, MEDIUM VARIANT, 2005-2050 (PERCENTAGE) 
 
 Age 0-14  15-59  60+  80+  Total 
                Population 
World              -0.03  0.65  2.43  3.38  0.76 
 
Europe          -0.41            -0.70  0.93  2.02            -0.21 
 
N. America 0.25  0.38  1.73  2.42  0.65 
 
TABLE II:1.  ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED TOTAL FERTILITY FOR THE WORLD, MAJOR 
DEVELOPMENT GROUPS AND MAJOR AREAS, 1970-1975, 2005-2010 AND 2045-2050, ACCORDING 
TO VARIANTS 
 
   Total Fertility (average number of children per woman) 
   1970-1975  2005-2010  2045-2050 (low) 
 
World   4.47   2.55   1.54  
 
Europe   2.16   1.45   1.26 
 
Northern America 2.01   2.00   1.35 
  
 
